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Abstract
We apply the asymmetric ARDL model advanced by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2009)
to the analysis of the patterns of pass-through from policy-controlled interest rates to a variety of
longer-term rates in the U.S. and Germany. Our results reveal three main phenomena. Firstly, while
the e®ect of a rate hike is largely con¯ned to the short-run, the e®ect of a rate cut is muted in
the short-run but non-negligible at longer horizons. We characterise this pattern as a switch from
short-run positive asymmetry to long-run negative asymmetry, a pattern that potentially reconciles
the con°icting empirical evidence and theoretical conjectures that dominate the existing literature.
Secondly, our results con¯rm that there has been a decoupling of long-term rates from policy-controlled
rates during the period of the Great Moderation in both the U.S. and Germany, albeit in a complex and
nonlinear way. Thirdly, by replicating Taylor's (2007) counterfactual exercise using our asymmetric
models, we ¯nd that Taylor over-estimates the importance of policy-controlled rates for the broader
economy. Equivalently, our results do not support Greenspan's belief that the decoupling is a recent
phenomenon. In light of our ¯ndings, we conclude that a narrow focus on the interest rate as the sole
instrument of monetary policy is likely to be sub-optimal under current institutional arrangements.
JEL Classi¯cations: C22, E43, E52.
Keywords: Asymmetric ARDL Model and Dynamic Multipliers, Great Moderation, Asymmetric In-
terest Rate Pass-through.
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11 Introduction
Most economists regard interest rates as the principal avenue by which monetary policy a®ects economic
activity. The interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission can be described as follows: \[c]entral
banks exert a dominant in°uence on money market conditions and thereby steer money market interest
rates. Changes in money market interest rates in turn a®ect long-term market interest rates and retail
bank interest rates, albeit to varying degrees. Bank decisions regarding the yields paid on their assets and
liabilities have an impact on the expenditure and investment behaviour of deposit holders and borrowers
and thus real economic activity." (de Bondt, 2005, p. 6).
Two strands of empirical literature have been concerned with the linkage between money market rates
and longer-term rates. In continental Europe, where the ¯nancial system is traditionally 'bank-based',
central bankers and economists have analysed the pass-through from policy rates (or short-term money
market rates) to commercial banks' retail rates. In the U.S. and other countries with 'market-based'
¯nancial systems, the focus has been on the relationship between short-term interest rates and long-term
bond yields (i.e. the term structure of interest rates).
Empirical research of this type is of paramount importance to the conduct of monetary policy. In the
absence of a clear understanding of the transmission from policy-controlled interest rates to the relevant
lending rates, macroeconomic models in which the interest rate is treated as a single (or at least simple)
entity which exerts a decisive in°uence on aggregate demand are of limited use (Walsh, 2009). A topical
example has been provided by the Federal Reserve's behaviour in relation to the recent housing boom
and the subsequent ¯nancial crisis. While some authors have argued that monetary excesses resulting
from the Fed's deviation from the Taylor rule between 2003 and 2005 triggered the crisis (Taylor, 2007,
2009), many central bankers and economists alike have identi¯ed the decoupling of monetary policy from
long-term rates as a key factor leading up to the crisis (Greenspan, 2005, 2009; Rudebusch et al., 2006).
Furthermore, during the global recession of 2008/9, banks in both the U.S. and in Europe have been
repeatedly accused of failing to pass lower policy rates on to their clients (e.g. IMF, 2008; · Cih¶ ak et
al., 2009). Hence, one could argue that it was not the failure of the Fed to follow the Taylor rule that
instigated the crisis but rather that the limitations of monetary policy are much more structural.
In this paper, we apply the asymmetric ARDL model advanced by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo
(2009, henceforth SYG) to the analysis of the relationship between policy-controlled interest rates and
longer-term interest rates. Based on the single-equation error correction model and the associated dy-
namic multipliers, we are able to model asymmetries in both the long-run relationship and the pattern of
dynamic adjustment simultaneously and in a coherent manner. This represents an important innovation
relative to existing empirical studies that have modelled asymmetries only in the short-run dynamics or
the error correction mechanism. Following SYG, we argue that the linear models underlying much of
the existing research may be seriously misspeci¯ed and that the conclusions adduced on this basis may
be highly misleading when the unobserved data generating process (the 'true' transmission mechanism)
displays short- and/or long-run asymmetries.1 Hence, we expect that our approach may reconcile to
some extent the con°icting evidence of previous studies in relation to the asymmetric nature of the
transmission mechanism, both in terms of the degree of pass-through and the speed of adjustment.
We examine the U.S. as the archetypal market-based ¯nancial system and Germany, traditionally
considered a bank-based system. Interestingly, our results are qualitatively similar for both countries
1This may also explain the relatively common failure to identify a cointegrating relationship between the relevant interest
rates despite the general consensus that they follow non-stationary I(1) processes.
2despite the widely discussed di®erences between their ¯nancing arrangements. Based on our estimation
results for the U.S. over the two sub-periods 1965:1-1979:12 and 1984:1-2009:6, and Germany over the
period 1996:11-2009:6, we draw three broad conclusions. Firstly, we ¯nd that the long-run e®ects of
monetary policy on long-term interest rates became very weak during the Great Moderation, with long-
run pass-through coe±cients falling from approximately unity in the previous period and coming to lie
in the range of 0.1-0.6 during the Great Moderation.
Secondly, we observe that both short- and long-run asymmetries are highly signi¯cant and typically
act in opposite directions during the Great Moderation period. This ¯nding potentially reconciles the
seemingly con°icting theoretical conjectures and empirical evidence presented in the literature (e.g. Borio
and Fritz, 1995; de Bondt, 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Gropp et al., 2007). More speci¯cally,
we ¯nd that an interest rate hike exerts a considerable e®ect on longer-term rates in the short-run, but
that pass-through is much more muted just one year after the tightening. By contrast, an interest rate
cut fails to consistently a®ect longer-term rates within the ¯rst year but the long-run pass-through is
typically larger than in the case of a rate hike. Hence, our results indicate that the Great Moderation
period has been characterised by positive short-run asymmetry followed by a relatively rapid switch to
long-run negative asymmetry. Positive short-run asymmetry supports the view that monetary policy is
like a string that can be pulled but not pushed. Negative long-run asymmetry supports the view that
monetary policy, alongside globalisation and the liberalisation of global ¯nancial and labour markets,
has lowered in°ation expectations over the longer-run. Indeed, the combination of ¯nancial innovation,
weaker wage aspirations, higher interest-elasticity of credit demand and the reduced pricing power of
banks in a setting of increasingly competitive loan markets populated by well-informed and foot-loose
borrowers seems to have reduced the longer-term e®ects of monetary tightening on long-term interest
rates.
Finally, our results shed new light on the current controversy over the Fed's responsibility for the
housing boom that is thought to have led to the recent crisis. On the one hand, the very weak estimated
long-run pass-through throughout the entire period of the Great Moderation suggests that John Taylor
grossly overestimates the importance of policy-controlled interest rates. Equally, Alan Greenspan's
argument that the decoupling of monetary policy from long-term interest rates was con¯ned to the
period running up to the crisis in the housing market starting around 2002 is also misled.
The implications of our ¯ndings for the conduct of monetary policy are far-reaching. While it seems
that policymakers have the ability to cool an overheated economy via the interest rate channel in the
short-run, the maintenance of higher interest rates in the long-run (in an attempt, say, to prevent a
housing bubble) would require substantial and continual rate hikes. An attempt by the central bank to
meet these contradictory challenges would tend to be associated with lower than optimal real growth,
increased volatility and, thereby, uncertainty. Of more concern for demand management policies, it
seems that policymakers are unable to stimulate the economy in the short-run without enacting very
substantial rate cuts that may either create panic among market participants or lead the economy into
a liquidity trap as it reaches the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate.2 This line of reasoning
leads us inexorably to a controversial conclusion: when the pass-through from policy-controlled rates to
lending rates is incomplete, sluggish, or asymmetric, then the use of the interest rate as the preferred tool
for ¯ne-tuning aggregate demand must be called into question. Whether a central bank acting in such
2A number of alternative measures have been proposed whereby central banks could ease the monetary policy stance
once policy rates enter the neighbourhood of the zero lower bound. For example, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004)
suggest increasing the money supply beyond the level necessary for setting the policy rate at zero, and/or the provision of
liquidity to speci¯c credit markets that are considered dysfunctional.
3an environment opts to pursue the re-regulation of ¯nancial institutions to prevent asset price bubbles
and strengthen interest rate pass-through or chooses to develop alternative tools of demand management
such as countercyclical reserve requirements, what seems certain is that existing policy arrangements are
inadequate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews the literature and summarises a range of
theories that may explain positive and negative asymmetries acting over di®erent time horizons in the
pass-through mechanism. Section 3 outlines the non-linear ARDL model and Section 4 presents the main
empirical results. Section 5 explicitly addresses the question of whether the Fed lost control over long-
term rates during the Great Moderation while Section 6 discusses the policy-relevance of our ¯ndings.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Interest Rate Transmission Mechanism
The view that long-term interest rates depend largely on monetary policy is common, although not
uncontroversial, in the academic debate. A case for the causality running from monetary policy to long-
term interest rates, at least over the medium-term, is strongly argued by Blanchard (2003) in relation
to the pattern described by real interest rates in the 70's and 80's. Although this view is not meant
to deny the existence of an equilibrium long-term interest rate (to which monetary policy would have
to adjust), it nevertheless implies that monetary policy can a®ect the real interest rate for a decade
and perhaps more. We will follow this general view insofar as we treat the short-term market rate
as the explanatory variable, to which long-term interest rates react. This description of the monetary
transmission mechanism also underpins the understanding that central bankers themselves have about
their job. As noted by Greenspan (2005), \experience suggests that, other things being equal, increasing
short-term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. Ten-year yields, for
example, can be thought of as an average of ten consecutive one-year forward rates. A rise in the ¯rst-year
forward rate, which correlates closely with the federal funds rate, would increase the yield on ten-year
U.S. Treasury notes even if the more-distant forward rates remain unchanged. Historically, though, even
these distant forward rates have tended to rise in association with monetary policy tightening."
The counterpoint has been argued powerfully by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). The authors question
the role of central bank interest rate policies as a means of a®ecting long-term interest rates and, thereby,
investment and aggregate demand. In particular, they hold that one should not expect long-term interest
rates to respond strongly to changes in policy-administered short-term rates unless today's monetary
policy a®ects interest rate expectations many years into the future (p. 20). Moreover, as a result of
¯nancial innovation, long-term market rates are likely to become increasingly insulated from policy
rates. As a result, the impact of monetary policy will become increasingly concentrated in certain
sectors of the economy, particularly small and medium enterprises that are naturally more reliant on
bank ¯nance than their larger counterparts and must, therefore, bear the brunt of higher interest rates
to a greater extent (p. 197).
This debate raises two important questions. Firstly, has the monetary transmission mechanism
changed with ¯nancial innovation and globalisation and changes in the conduct of monetary policy?
Secondly, to what extent does the e®ect of monetary policy innovations di®er between bond yields and
retail bank lending rates, the former being more important in market-based systems and the latter in
bank-based ¯nancial systems? Before tackling these issues, we will brie°y review the existing empirical
literature studying both the bank interest rate pass-through and the term structure of bond yields.
4Furthermore, through careful consideration of a range of mechanisms that may cause asymmetries in
the pass-through from short- to long-term interest rates, we will attempt to reconcile the seemingly
con°icting conclusions reached by previous theoretical and empirical work in this respect.
2.1 Bank interest rate pass-through
The vast literature on interest rate pass-through starts from a simple mark-up pricing model (Rousseas,
1985):
rb
t = ® + ¯rm
t ; (2.1)
where rb
t is the lending rate charged by banks, rm
t the marginal cost approximated by a market interest
rate, ® a constant mark-up, and ¯ the pass-through parameter, which depends on the demand elasticity
of loans with respect to the retail bank interest rate.3 Because interest rates are usually found to follow
non-stationary I(1) processes, (2.1) can be estimated in the form of an error correction model capturing
both the long-run equilibrium between retail rates and market rates as well as the associated adjustment
dynamics.
Two approaches have been popularised in the literature (Kwapil and Scharler, 2006). The `cost-of-
funds approach' investigates the linkage between bank lending rates and market rates of comparable
maturities, which are seen as the accurate measure of banks' cost-of-funds (de Bondt, 2002, 2005). By
contrast, the `monetary policy approach' addresses the potentially cointegrating relationship between
bank lending rates and the policy rate (or short-term market rate taken as a proxy), assuming that
banks constantly engage in a process of maturity transformation in which they attempt to match the
demand for long-term loans with the supply of short-term deposits (Gropp et al., 2007). Notice that, as
monetary policy also a®ects banks' cost-of-funds, the monetary policy approach implicitly addresses an
important aspect of the cost-of-funds channel, particularly when one accounts for the forward-looking
behaviour of market participants (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004). Hence, we will follow the monetary
policy approach.
Empirical results on the bank interest rate pass-through are rather mixed (see Kwapil and Scharler,
2006, for a thorough survey). However, a consensus ¯nding is that the pass-through from policy or
market rates to retail rates is both sluggish and incomplete (e.g., Cottarelli and Kourelis 1994; Mojon,
2000; Sorensen and Werner, 2007). This may be partially explained by imperfect competition, implicit
contracts and the long-term relationships between banks and their customers: that is to say that banks
insulate customers from volatile market rates (de Bondt, 2002; Allen and Gale, 2004). Furthermore,
sluggish adjustment may re°ect the presence of transaction costs including labour, computing and no-
ti¯cation costs. Acting rationally, a bank will only change its interest rates when the gain strictly
dominates the associated costs. Retail lending rates are likely to be sticky in inelastic markets and the
demand for retail bank products is likely to be less elastic in the short-run. Hence, banks facing ¯xed
adjustment costs will adjust their retail rates promptly only if the costs of keeping a disequilibrium rate
exceed these adjustment costs (de Bondt, 2002; Liu et al., 2008).
Two further stylised ¯ndings are apparent in the existing literature. Firstly, the pass-through from
policy-administered interest rates to longer-term rates is smaller among the Euro area countries (esti-
mates of the long-run pass-through coe±cient ¯ typically range between 0.4 and 0.75) than in the U.S.,
where it often approaches unity. Secondly, the degree of pass-through tends to decrease as the maturity
of the loan increases.
3¯ is expected to be less than one if the demand for loans is not fully elastic.
52.2 Pass-through to bond yields: the term structure of interest rates
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure implies a cointegrating relationship between short-
and long-term interest rates with the cointegrating vector, [1;¡1], as shown by Campbell and Shiller
(1987). The implication is that, if the expectations hypothesis is upheld, pass-through from short- to
long-term rates should be complete and presumably symmetric. However, the expectations hypothesis
has not enjoyed much success empirically. For example, using monthly data in the regression of the
20-year T-bill rate on the one-month T-bill rate over the period 1959:1-1979:8, Campbell and Shiller
obtain a long-run coe±cient of only 0.74. Moreover, they report the failure of the residual-based Engle
and Granger (1987) test to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.
A vast literature has subsequently analysed the predictive power of the long-short spread in explaining
the evolution of both short- and long-term interest rates. Consider the following equations:








¡ r1;t = ® + ¯
m ¡ 1
m
(rm;t ¡ r1;t) (2.3)
where rm is the long-term interest rate for a bond of maturity m, and r1 is the short-term interest
rate. Again, the empirical results have typically been disappointing, giving rise to the `Campbell-Shiller
paradox' that the estimate of ¯ in (2.2) is typically di®erent from one and even of the wrong sign. Using
the second regression, (2.3), some weak support for the expectations hypothesis is con¯rmed only for
bond yields with very short and very long maturities (Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Campbell, 1995).
However, more advanced tests proposed by Thornton (2006) and Sarno et al. (2009) also fail to support
the expectations hypothesis.
Various explanations for the empirical failure of the expectations hypothesis have been proposed,
including Peso problems (Bekaert et al. 2001), the failure to take the central bank reaction function and
interest rate smoothing into account (Mankiw and Miron, 1986; McCallum, 2005; Kugler, 1997; Hsu and
Kugler, 1997), regime switching, time-varying liquidity premia and macro factors a®ecting the behaviour
of the term structure (Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Bansal and Zhou, 2002; Clarida et al., 2005).
2.3 Asymmetric interest rate pass-through
In general, di®erent theories can be invoked to argue that the pass-through from policy-controlled interest
rates to longer-term lending rates may be asymmetric. However, there is disagreement as to the direction
of asymmetry and the timeframe over which it may operate. Furthermore, the mechanisms underlying
asymmetric pass-through are likely to di®er between retail bank rates and bond yields.
2.3.1 Positive asymmetry
We de¯ne positive asymmetry as the case in which increases in policy-controlled interest rates a®ect
longer-term rates more quickly and/or strongly than decreases. Clearly this de¯nition admits both
short- and long-run e®ects. We will elaborate on this distinction in due course. It follows that positive
asymmetric pass-through indicates that monetary policy may be more e®ective in containing an over-
heating economy rather than ¯ghting a recession. This is the argument that monetary policy is like a
string that can be pulled but not pushed.
6Positive asymmetry in the case of bank lending rates may emerge for a variety of reasons:
(i.) The bank-borrower relationship may be characterised by switching costs or incomplete information
on the part of bank clients. When market rates increase, banks quickly raise their lending rates,
thereby maintaining their mark-up. On the contrary, when market rates decrease, banks take this
opportunity to increase their mark-up by reducing their lending rates either incompletely or slowly
or both. Switching and information costs may be particularly relevant in the case of consumer and
mortgage loans and business loans (e.g. Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 2000).
(ii.) Lending rates may exhibit downward rigidity (e.g. Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Wang and Thi,
2010). From the banks' point of view, the risk of triggering a price war through rate reductions
tends to make downward revisions inherently costly in oligopolistic markets. Hence, positive asym-
metry may result from the willingness of banks to raise rates but not to cut them.
(iii.) Positive asymmetry may arise as a demand-side phenomenon, linked to business cycle trends. The
demand for bank funds may become more inelastic during recessions, as bank-borrower relation-
ships are strengthened and borrowers become more captive to their traditional sources of funds.
In this setting, a lower interest rate-elasticity of credit demand would allow banks to raise their
mark-up as policy-controlled rates decrease during a recession. If market interest rates tend to fall
during recessions, a positively asymmetric response would be detected in the data (e.g. Borio and
Fritz, 1995; Clausen and Hayo, 2006).
Moving on to the bond market, longer-term interest rates re°ect expected future short-term interest
rates and a risk premium. However, when the perception of risk varies with bond market volatility
and business cycle indicators, then the pass-through from short-term rates to longer-term yields can be
asymmetric. At least two channels can be readily identi¯ed:
(i.) During recessions, in which policy rates tend to fall, bond markets may fail to pass-through the
monetary loosening if market participants have a high liquidity preference and expect that bond
prices will fall further (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003, pp. 40-1). By contrast, when the central
bank raises the policy rate in reaction to an overheated economy, the transmission of monetary
policy via the ¯nancial markets may be much more e±cient.
(ii.) When investors and borrowers are highly leveraged, investors may overreact to a sudden increase
in policy rates (which they take to indicate the end of the boom and an increasing likelihood of
bankruptcies among leveraged ¯rms) and may come to require higher excess returns on long-term
corporate bonds (e.g. Campbell, 1995). Moreover, as global ¯nancial markets become increasingly
integrated, this e®ect is likely to become more prominent. As Stiglitz (2010) notes, far from re-
ducing risk through greater global diversi¯cation, the integration of ¯nancial markets may increase
the likelihood that adverse circumstances at a national or regional level may be transmitted more
widely. In the extreme case, this may lead to bankruptcy cascades or even ¯nancial contagion.
2.3.2 Negative asymmetry
We de¯ne negative asymmetry equivalently as the case in which increases in policy-controlled interest
rates a®ect longer-term rates less quickly and/or less strongly than decreases. For bank lending rates,
there are equally well-founded reasons to expect that the pass-through from policy-controlled rates to
longer-term lending rates could be negatively asymmetric:
7(i.) In the presence of asymmetric information, lending rates may be upwardly sticky due to adverse
selection problems. In general, banks may fear that they will attract more risky borrowers when
lending rates increase (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; de Bondt, 2002).
(ii.) Due to the development of new ¯nancial products and the emergence of globalised, highly com-
petitive ¯nancial markets with increased availability of credit, it may be expected that there is a
generalised downward pressure on lending rates. Indeed, the loss of pricing power of banks (and
other ¯rms) seems to be a generalised phenomenon associated with globalisation and the Great
Moderation (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Greenspan, 2005). This could be re°ected, inter alia, in a negatively
asymmetric pass-through from policy rates to lending rates, as lenders are obliged to lower their
rates during monetary expansions and to insulate their customers from rate rises during periods
of monetary tightening. In particular, if re¯nancing costs are low (e.g. for ¯xed-rate mortgages),
negative asymmetric pass-through may become endemic as borrowers will opt to re¯nance their
¯xed-rate mortgages and other loans only as interest rates fall (Sellon, 2002). Furthermore, banks
have historically tended to o®er low ¯xed `teaser' rates on mortgages in the short-run in order to
attract borrowers before a transition to higher °oating rates in the medium- and long-run. Hence,
banks may avoid adjusting their ¯xed mortgage rates upward but act quickly to bring them down
whenever possible in order to either remain competitive or even to compete for market share (Liu
et al., 2008).
In the bond market, insofar as nominal long-term rates re°ect expected future short-term rates,
negative asymmetry can be linked to expectations about in°ation and central bank policy reactions
during periods of boom and slack:
(i.) When the central bank has gained credibility in ¯ghting in°ation, initial in°ationary pressures may
be alleviated quickly by the central bank's decision to raise the policy rate, thereby reducing output
and in°ation volatility (e.g. Taylor, 2007). Hence, market interest rates may underreact to the rate
hike, re°ecting a belief on the part of market participants that further substantial increases in the
short-term rate are unlikely.
(ii.) Similarly, in the presence of generalised downward pressure on wages, which could be due to both
globalisation (increasing the abundance of labour) or to labour market institutions, even low levels
of unemployment may not lead to persistent in°ationary pressures (e.g. Stiglitz, 1997). In this
situation, market participants may not expect that continuous interest rate hikes will be necessary
to cool down the economy, thus generating a weak reaction to a policy rate hike.
(iii.) By contrast, when economic downturns and disin°ationary tendencies are di±cult to overcome
and the central bank has a strong preference for recession-avoidance, then the bond market may
anticipate that an initial monetary expansion is likely to be followed by further rate cuts in the
near future. Hence, market interest rates may react more strongly to the initial rate cut, generating
negative asymmetry.
2.3.3 Empirical evidence
Very few studies have documented empirical evidence of asymmetric interest rate pass-through in a
rigorous manner. An early contribution was made by Dueker and Thornton (1994). Employing an
ordered probit model, they ¯nd that the changes in the U.S. prime bank rate are more likely to follow
8when policy rates increase than when they fall, see also Dueker (2000) for an extended results. This
conclusion was reinforced by Mester and Saunders (1995), who estimate a logit model with monotonically
increasing or decreasing prime rates. Their results suggest that adjustment costs are important to the
prime rate adjustment process, and that changes in exogenous variables have a signi¯cantly larger e®ect
on the probability of a prime rate increase than a decrease.
Borio and Fritz (1995) estimate error correction models (ECM) for various OECD countries and fail
to ¯nd statistically signi¯cant evidence of asymmetric pass-through. However, where asymmetries are
seemingly present, the response of lending rates is faster with respect to increases in market rates than
to decreases. On the other hand, based on a study of selected European countries, Gual (1999) ¯nds
that higher competition tends to put pressure on banks to adjust lending rates more quickly when money
market rates are decreasing than when they are increasing. Interestingly, he also shows that while higher
competition tends to reduce the ability of banks to increase lending rates in response to increasing money
market rates, this e®ect is not statistically signi¯cant.
Relying on visual inspection of 3-month windows across sub-sample periods for the Euro area, Mojon
(2000) holds that the pass-through to credit rates was higher in periods with rising interest rates than
in times of falling rates. Heinemann and SchÄ uler (2002) derive similar conclusions for several European
countries over sub-samples re°ecting periods of either expansionary or restrictive monetary policies.
They also argue that national di®erences in the speed of pass-through within the EU can be regarded
as a retail-oriented indicator of ¯nancial integration, and that consumers could gain from a convergence
of adjustment speeds around the fastest levels.
More recently, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) estimate a nonlinear ECM for the Euro area and ¯nd
that upward adjustment is often faster than downward adjustment under the assumption that pass-
through is common and symmetric in the long-run. Gropp et al. (2007) estimate a dynamic panel data
model and ¯nd that loan rates in the Euro area tend to adjust more rapidly when market rates move
upwards than when they move downwards, although this ¯nding is statistically insigni¯cant. Employing
an asymmetric threshold ECM in conjunction with an EGARCH-in-mean, Wang and Thi (2010) ¯nd
evidence of asymmetric adjustment speeds in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. More speci¯cally, they ¯nd
evidence of upward rigidity in the deposit rate and downward rigidity in the lending rate.
While the papers surveyed above are indicative of positive asymmetry, a notable reference to the
contrary is Sellon (2002). Relying on visual inspection of U.S. interest rates, he provides evidence of
negatively asymmetric pass-through from policy rates to mortgage rates. Similarly, Liu et al. (2008)
examine the degree of pass-through and the adjustment speed of retail interest rates in response to
changes in market rates in New Zealand during the period 1994-2004. The authors employ the Phillips-
Loretan approach to cointegration analysis due to its strong performance in ¯nite sample and ¯nd that
banks appear to pass on decreases to ¯xed mortgage rates more rapidly than increases.
2.3.4 An apparent contradiction
While there is somewhat more evidence of positive than negative asymmetry in the literature, we have
strong theoretical and practical reasons to doubt the validity of many of the existing empirical studies.
As will become clear, we contend that these seemingly con°icting results derive from the failure to
di®erentiate between positive and negative asymmetries, and over the short- and the long-run. The only
paper of which we are aware that addresses the modelling of both short- and long-run asymmetries is
Borio and Fritz (1995), which attempts to account for asymmetries both in ¯rst-di®erence and level
9coe±cients. However, their approach su®ers from a number of signi¯cant limitations, not least of which
is their failure to account for unit roots and cointegration and the ambiguity surrounding their testing
procedure.
A partial discussion of the long-run/short-run distinction is o®ered by de Bondt (2002, p. 10), who
argues that the degree of market power and the costs associated with asymmetric information are both
likely to have long-run e®ects, while switching costs are expected to play a particularly signi¯cant part
in the short-run adjustment process of bank rates to market interest rates.4 Continuing with this line
of reasoning, we may attempt to classify each of the asymmetry generating mechanisms discussed above
into those acting predominantly in the long- and in the short-run. Focusing ¯rst on those e®ects that
are expected to generate positive asymmetry, we argue that it is trivially the case that switching costs,
business cycle e®ects and liquidity preference will act mainly over the short- to medium-run. By contrast,
it also seems relatively uncontroversial to assume that the in°uence exerted over banks' pricing behaviour
by imperfect competition may act over any horizon while information costs are likely to play a role over
the medium- to long-run. Moving on to the case of negative asymmetry, it is obvious that the generalised
downward pressure on interest rates associated with ¯nancial innovation and globalisation will act over
all horizons but, perhaps, particularly strongly in the long-run. By contrast, we may expect asymmetric
information and re¯nancing e®ects to be limited to the long-run. Similarly, the e®ects of deregulation
in the labour market in containing wage spirals are likely to act predominantly over the medium- to
long-run. Table 1 o®ers a crude attempt at generality in light of this characterisation of asymmetry
generating mechanisms into the short- and long-run.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In general, one can entertain the following four principal scenarios depending on the strength of
downward rigidity relative to upward rigidity: (i) positive asymmetry in the short- and the long-run; (ii)
positive asymmetry in the short-run and negative asymmetry in the long-run; (iii) negative asymmetry
in the short-run and positive asymmetry in the long-run; and (iv) negative asymmetry in the short-
and the long-run. At an over-arching level, we may expect to observe positively asymmetric pass-
through in the short-run before a switch to negative asymmetry in the long-run. In particular, one
may argue that the required increase in excess bond returns following a sudden bout of in°ation and
the associated monetary tightening will be only temporary when the central bank manages to stabilise
in°ation expectations quickly. More generally, if the central bank has established credibility in breaking
in°ationary pressures and the risk of persistent wage-price spirals is contained, then the e®ect of a
monetary tightening on longer-term interest rates (both market rates and bank lending rates) may be
relatively short-lived. By contrast, lower policy rates are likely to exert a weak short-run in°uence over
longer-term rates, especially in a recessionary environment when agents are markedly risk-averse and
exhibit a high liquidity preference. However, the degree of pass-through may be more substantial in
the long-run when the central bank continues with its expansionary policy. In addition, the structural
changes in global labour and ¯nancial markets can be expected to reinforce the overall downward pressure
on bond yields and bank lending rates in the long-run.
4Note, however, that de Bondt (2002) estimates a linear error correction model which is inherently incapable of capturing
dynamic asymmetric pass-through patterns.
103 The Asymmetric Nonlinear ARDL (NARDL) Model
SYG advance a simple technique for modelling both long- and short-run asymmetries in a coherent
manner. The model is essentially an asymmetric extension of the linear ARDL approach to modelling
long-run (cointegrating) levels relationships originated by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (2001, PSS). Consider the asymmetric cointegrating relationship:
yt = ¯+0x+
t + ¯0¡x¡
t + ut; (3.4)
where xt is a k £ 1 vector of regressors decomposed as:























and ¯+ and ¯¡ are the associated asymmetric long-run parameters. The extension of (3.4) to the
ARDL(p;q) case is straightforward, yielding the following asymmetric error correction model:
















We refer to (3.7) as the asymmetric or non-linear ARDL (NARDL) model. This approach has a
number of advantages over the existing class of regime-switching models. Firstly, once the regressors,
xt, are decomposed into x+
t and x¡
t , (3.7) can be estimated simply by standard OLS. Secondly, the null
hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the levels of yt, x+
t and x¡
t (i.e. ½ = µ+ = µ¡ = 0) can
be easily tested using the bounds-testing procedure advanced by PSS and SYG, which remains valid
irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Thirdly, (3.7) nests the
following two special cases: (i) long-run symmetry where µ+ = µ¡ = µ, and (ii) short-run symmetry in
which ¼+
i = ¼¡
i for all i = 0;:::;q.
SYG further di®erentiate between two forms of short-run symmetry restrictions: strong-form (pair-
wise) symmetry and weak-form (additive) symmetry. Given that we will employ general-to-speci¯c lag
selection which is likely to include heterogeneous lags of the positive and negative partial sum processes
in the model, it follows that we should limit our attention to the weak-form restrictions. Moreover, as
SYG note that the small sample performance of the Wald test for additive short-run symmetry may be
rather low, we shall use bootstrapped con¯dence intervals in order to identify short-run asymmetries.
Reliable inference can be achieved in relation to the long-run symmetry restrictions using the standard
5At present, we evaluate the di®erential e®ects of positive and negative shocks to the explanatory variables under the
assumption of a single known threshold value. Indeed, the construction of positive and negative partial sum processes
relies on the imposition of a zero threshold. However, this assumption can be easily relaxed to accomodate the more
general case of multiple unknown threshold decompositions (Greenwood-Nimmo, Shin and Van Treeck, 2010). Similarly,
we currently work under the implicit assumption that positive and negative shocks to the explantory variables occur with
equal probability. In the current context this is a largely innocuous simpli¯cation as the mean values of ¢r
m are relatively
close to zero over our sample, implying that Pr(¢r
m > 0) ¼ Pr(¢r
m < 0) ¼ 0:5. However, in the general case in which
this condition is not satis¯ed, as with all regime-switching models, one must allow for the impact of the respective regime
probabilities in the evaluation of the asymmetric dynamic multipliers.
11Wald test as normal. Only when both the long- and short-run symmetry restrictions cannot be rejected
should the restricted linear ARDL(p;q) model be entertained:
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Finally, the asymmetric ARDL model, (3.7) can be used to derive the asymmetric cumulative dynamic
multiplier e®ects of a unit change in x+
t and x¡















; h = 0;1;2::: (3.9)
By construction, as h ! 1, m+
h and m¡
h tend to approach the respective asymmetric long-run coef-
¯cients. The ability of the dynamic multipliers to illuminate the traverse from initial equilibrium, via
short-run disequilibrium following a shock, to a new long-run equilibrium makes them a powerful tool
for the combined analysis of (short-run) adjustment asymmetry and (long-run) response asymmetry. In
this regard, the dynamic multipliers derived from the transfer function from x+ and x¡ to y are likely
to prove particularly advantageous in the analysis of positive and negative asymmetries in the dynamics
of interest rate pass-through, as reviewed in subsection 2.3.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Dataset
In order to estimate the NARDL model, (3.7),6 we collect data pertaining to various lending rates and
bond yields for the U.S. and Germany. For the U.S., data are taken from the Federal Reserve interest
rate series (H. 15). Firstly, we use the 3-month T-bill rate as a proxy for the monetary stance of the
central bank. This is standard practice in the literature as the T-bill rate is preferable to the federal
funds rate since it shows larger variation. For our lending rates and bond yields, we employ the 30-year
conventional ¯xed mortgage rate, the 10-year T-bill rate, and ¯nally the AAA- and BAA-rated corporate
bond yields.7 All data is at monthly frequency.
Monthly German data is collected from the Bundesbank and European Central Bank (ECB). In this
case, we employ the 3-month money market rate, the lending rates for small and large long-term bank
loans, the mortgage rate for mortgages with initial ¯xation of 10 years, and the composite bond yield.8
Due to the limited availability of data, the sample period starts from 1996. Finally, we should note that
since the adoption of the Euro area-wide harmonised reporting system, national statistical reporting has
been withdrawn in Germany. Therefore, we chain-link the Bundesbank and the ECB series using the
growth rates of the pre-2003 Bundesbank series.
6We estimate three di®erent speci¯cations of (3.7). Note that we choose to omit the case of long-run asymmetry
and short-run symmetry in the interest of brevity and because it is the least interesting combination of asymmetries on
theoretical grounds. Estimation results for this case are available on request. To improve estimation precision, we conduct
general-to-speci¯c lag selection starting from a maximum lag order of 12 (6 for the mortgage rate for the ¯rst sub-period)
and applying a sequential 5% signi¯cance rule as implemented by Eviews version 6.
7The data for the mortgage rates are unavailable prior to 1971.
8Estimations using the mortgage rate with initial ¯xation of 5 years yield qualitatively very similar results.
124.2 Asymmetric pass-through in the U.S.
Table 2 reports estimation results for the U.S. over the two sub-periods 1965:1-1979:12 and 1984:1-
2009:69. Each of these periods is likely to correspond to an homogenous monetary policy regime (Smith
and Taylor, 2007). The latter sub-period also corresponds to what has been dubbed the 'Great Moder-
ation', during which the volatility of both output and in°ation fell sharply (Bernanke, 2004). Moreover,
this period is associated with the new approach to monetary policy that was initiated by Paul Volcker
and has subsequently been pursued by his successors (Clarida et al., 1999; Taylor, 1999; Woodford,
2003). Figures 1 and 2 report the cumulative dynamic multipliers associated with the fully asymmetric
speci¯cation presented in Table 2. These ¯gures trace the e®ect of a unit change in the policy-controlled
interest rate both on bank lending rates and on bond yields.
TABLE 2 AND FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
In the ¯rst sub-period, the correlation of the short-term, policy-controlled interest rate with the bank
lending rates and the long-term bond yields is relatively tight, with an adjusted R2 typically between 0.5
and 0.7. The PSS F-test con¯rms that a long-run (cointegrating) relationship exists between them in all
cases. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit cointegrating coe±cient for the corporate bond
yields, providing some support for the expectations hypothesis of the term structure and, thereby, for the
hypothesis of complete pass-through. A common ¯nding over the ¯rst sub-period is that the short-run
asymmetries are either signi¯cantly positive or insigni¯cant. Indeed, in the case of bond yields, the
short-run asymmetry remains statistically signi¯cant for more than three years. By contrast, we observe
mixed evidence of long-run asymmetry. While the null hypothesis of long-run symmetry cannot be
rejected in the case of AAA and BAA bond yields, it is rejected for the 10-year T-bill and the mortgage
rates, where we observe slight positive asymmetry.10 Overall, we ¯nd that the long-run pass-through
coe±cients are close to unity. Furthermore, the dynamic transmission pattern is very similar for all
long-term interest rates, indicating that they are (slightly) positively asymmetric in both the short- and
the long- run.
Moving on to the second sub-period, we note that the estimation results di®er sharply from those
in the earlier period. Table 2 shows that the degree of pass-through is generally weaker, with the pass-
through coe±cients typically taking values considerably below unity for all interest rates. Indeed, the
long-run pass-through coe±cients vary widely, both across the di®erent asymmetric speci¯cations and
across the di®erent interest rate series. In particular, the estimates from the restricted models seem to be
severely biased and overestimate the long-run pass-through. The Wald tests and bootstrapped con¯dence
intervals indicate that both short- and long-run asymmetries are highly signi¯cant for all interest rates,
and the PSS F-test con¯rms the existence of a long-run asymmetric levels relationship in the fully
9In order to conserve space we choose to tabulate estimates of the long-run parameters, key inferential statistics and a
range of diagnostic statistics but we omit the estimated short-run dynamics. The salient features of the latter are captured
by the cumulative dynamic multipliers. Moreover, note that all of the dynamic terms included in the various models are
highly signi¯cant by construction given that we employ general-to-speci¯c lag selection. Full estimation results are available
on request.
10The estimation results for the mortgage rate warrant some additional discussion. These estimates are somewhat less
reliable due to the relatively short sample period. In this case, the long-run coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant only
for the fully asymmetric speci¯cation, suggesting that the results obtained from the linear model are misleading. This is
an interesting ¯nding given that it is a common practice in the literature to estimate the model in ¯rst di®erences when
no evidence of cointegration is found (e.g. Mojon, 2000; Kwapil and Scharler, 2006). We argue that the failure to con¯rm
a cointegrating relationship may derive from the failure to account for fundamental asymmetries in the data generating
process. In this case, models in ¯rst di®erences are clearly biased in the presence of an asymmetric cointegrating relationship
(SYG).
13asymmetric speci¯cation for all interest rates. A general pattern that emerges is the traverse from short-
run positive asymmetry to long-run negative asymmetry, with the switch taking place approximately
one year after the initial policy innovation. More speci¯cally, longer-term rates initially react relatively
strongly to a monetary tightening before the reaction dies away in the long-run. By contrast, the opposite
pattern is observed in the case of a loosening of monetary policy: longer-term rates show only a small
initial reaction which gradually becomes more pronounced in the long-run.
4.3 Asymmetric pass-through in Germany
Given that the dataset for Germany starts in 1996, we use the full sample in estimation. Although it
would be desirable to have a longer span of data, the available data has the advantage that it avoids
the issue of potential structural breaks related to the German uni¯cation in 1991 and the preparations
leading to the adoption of the Euro after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1996. The results are reported in
Table 3 and the associated cumulative dynamic multipliers in Figure 3.
Overall, the results are strikingly similar to the U.S. results obtained for the second sub-period. The
adjusted R2 typically lies slightly below 0.4 for the fully asymmetric speci¯cations, as in the case of the
U.S. Both the Wald and the PSS tests suggest that the fully asymmetric models are the most reliable.
Not only do the restricted models mostly fail to produce signi¯cant evidence of a levels (cointegrating)
relationship, they also seem to over-estimate the long-run pass-through coe±cients. Following the fully
asymmetric speci¯cations, the degree of pass-through is similar to the U.S. case, with estimated long-run
coe±cients ranging between 0.2 and 0.5. Once again, we ¯nd evidence of short- and long-run asymmetries
acting in opposite directions. Lending rates tend to overshoot following an interest rate hike, but react
more sluggishly in response to a monetary loosening. In the longer-run, however, we ¯nd rather strong
evidence of negative asymmetry. The Wald tests and bootstrapped con¯dence intervals indicate that
both short- and long-run asymmetries are statistically signi¯cant for all interest rates. The most notable
di®erence is that the short-run positive asymmetry is typically somewhat more persistent in Germany
than in the U.S. The otherwise striking similarities between our results for the U.S. and Germany suggest
that the widely discussed di®erences between market- and bank-based ¯nancial systems may have become
less signi¯cant at the level of the end-user in recent years.
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5 Has there been a decoupling in the U.S.?
We now examine the increasingly pervasive argument that the Fed lost control over longer-term inter-
est rates in the years leading up to the housing price bubble and the subsequent ¯nancial crisis. As
Greenspan (2009) famously complained, \between 1971 and 2002, the fed-funds rate and the (long-term
¯xed) mortgage rate moved in lockstep. The correlation between them was tight at 0.85. Between 2002
and 2005, however, the correlation diminished to insigni¯cance." The estimation results reported above
indicate unambiguously that this view is excessively simplistic. Rather, our sub-sample analysis in Sec-
tion 4.2 suggests that the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism appears to have fundamentally
changed considerably earlier.
Simple visual inspection of Figure 4 further substantiates this contention: it appears that the decou-
pling of the long-term ¯xed mortgage rate from policy-controlled rates has been a common phenomenon
in the U.S. during phases of monetary tightening since the mid-1980s. During this time, there have
14been four periods in which the Fed has raised interest rates over an extended period of time. Between
1988 and 1989, the mortgage rate remained almost completely °at despite pronounced gradual increases
in the federal funds rate. Between February and April 1994, while we observe pronounced short-run
overshooting of the mortgage rate in reaction to the Fed's tightening, by early 1995 the mortgage rate
had almost returned to its early 1994 level despite continued interest rate hikes administered by the
Fed.11 In 1999 and 2000, we again observe an apparent disconnect between the mortgage rate and the
policy rate during a monetary tightening: while the short-term rate increased by about 2 percentage
points between mid-1999 and late 2000, the long-term mortgage rate returned to its initial level after a
temporary, but subdued, increase in early 2000. In light of these observations, it is clearly incorrect to
argue that the decoupling observed in the mid-2000s was a new phenomenon.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Further support for this view can be derived from our NARDL model. When we re-estimate the
model for the mortgage rate for the period 1984:1-2009:6 and control for the alleged conundrum period
by including a dummy variable taking the value of unity during 2003:1-2005:12, we obtain a point
estimate of 0.002 with a standard error of 0.04. Furthermore, when we estimate the model for the sub-
period 1984:1-2001:12, or for a range of arbitrarily chosen sample periods ending prior to the so-called
conundrum period, the long-run coe±cients do not change materially. We obtain estimated long-run
coe±cients of 0.413 (positive) and 0.590 (negative) with standard errors of 0.101 and 0.079, respectively.12
On the basis of these results, and in conjunction with Figure 4, we are unable to discern any di®erence
between Greenspan's conundrum period and the earlier episodes of monetary tightening described above
save for the fact that the short-run overshooting of the mortgage rate may have been slightly weaker
following the monetary tightening in 2004 than in earlier periods. This observation stands in stark
contrast to Rudebusch et al. (2006), who argue that the inability of their pair of macro-¯nancial models
to explain the behaviour of long yields in the proposed conundrum period substantiates Greenspan's
claim. However, their conclusion that a reduction in the volatility of long-term bond yields underlies
the apparently strange behaviour of the bond market is acutely vulnerable to criticisms surrounding the
direction of causality.
In Figure 5, we conduct a counterfactual simulation in order to assess the hypothetical e®ects that
an earlier monetary tightening would have had on selected bond yields and lending rates, given our
estimation results. Figure 5(a) is reproduced from Taylor (2007, p. 3, Figure 1) who also conducts a
counterfactual exercise, in which the actual and the alternative paths of the federal funds rate depart
in the second quarter of 2002 and merge again in the third quarter of 2006, as in our Figure 5. The
simulations in Figures 5(b) to 5(c) are based on the three di®erent speci¯cations of the pass-through
equations reported in Table 2. We note that the increase in the AAA corporate bond yields and the
mortgage rate would have been rather limited had the Fed followed the policy stance recommended by
the Taylor rule.13 In 2004, the point at which the deviation of the Fed's policy from the Taylor rule
was most pronounced, the AAA bond yields and mortgage rates would have been less than 0.75 and
11Campbell (1995, p. 145) attributes this overshooting to a temporary increase in excess returns on long-term bonds,
which may have been due to a higher e®ective risk aversion of market participants linked to increased losses incurred by
highly leveraged bond traders.
12Note that the overshooting of the mortgage rate is somewhat more pronounced for this reduced sample, with the
short-run multiplier exceeding unity. This e®ect is not apparent in relation to any other long-term rates.
13Of course, the results from such a counterfactual experiment must be treated with caution because we do not account for
potential feedback e®ects between long rates and other macroeconomic factors and the decisions of the monetary authority.
151.2 percentage points higher, respectively, than in the baseline scenario according to our preferred, fully
asymmetric model. It is di±cult to imagine how such a limited increase in long-term rates could have
prevented the housing bubble, fuelled as it was by expectations of two-digit growth rates in housing
prices. Hence, we conclude that Taylor's (2009) belief that the housing boom is primarily attributable
to the Fed's interest rate policies is mistaken.
Again, it is important to note that both the size of the pass-through coe±cient and the dynamic
pattern of the adjustment process di®er substantially depending on the nature of the asymmetries that
we allow for in the underlying estimations. In particular, when we account for short- and long-run
asymmetries, we observe substantial overshooting and persistent deviations from the baseline scenarios
considerably beyond 2006. This is yet another manifestation of our earlier argument that the results of
existing linear models must be treated with extreme caution, if not scepticism, given their pronounced
bias in the presence of an asymmetric data generating process.
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Finally, we note that the di®erence between the paths followed by the bond rates and the bank lending
rates substantiates our earlier claim that the impact of monetary policy will vary considerably between
di®erent sectors of the economy, with large ¯rms relying on bond issuance and small ¯rms and consumers
relying on bank loans to raise funds.14 Moreover, as is readily apparent in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), since the
Great Moderation BAA bond yields have responded more strongly to contractionary monetary policies
than AAA yields, both in the long-run and also in terms of the persistence of the short-run impact of
the rate hike. This further suggests that smaller (and perhaps less ¯nancially robust) ¯rms tend to bear
a disproportionate share of the burden of higher interest rates.15
6 Policy Implications
Our empirical analysis indicates unequivocally that the pass-through from the policy-administered inter-
est rate to various longer-term market rates exhibits widespread, pervasive and complex asymmetries of
a time-varying nature. This ¯nding o®ers an intuitive explanation of the divergent evidence adduced in
the existing empirical and theoretical literature. Moreover, our results pose a fundamental challenge to
established macroeconomic theory, which maintains that setting the policy-controlled short-term interest
rate appropriately is the essence of good monetary policy, with relatively little attention being a®orded
to the long-term rates to which we may expect leveraged agents to react more strongly and/or directly.16
The reduction in the long-term pass-through since the mid-1980s is not necessarily inconsistent with
the view that monetary policy has become more e±cient in ¯ghting in°ation during the Great Moder-
ation. In fact, initial signs of in°ationary pressures repeatedly turned out to be short-lived throughout
14The prime bank lending rate tracks the policy-controlled rate very closely. The impact of monetary policy on borrowers
that depend largely on bank ¯nance will, therefore, be quite di®erent to the case of borrowers with ready access to market
¯nance (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003, p. 197).
15See · Cih¶ ak et al. (2009) for a similar ¯nding that the pass-through to higher-grade bond yields is smaller than to lower-
grade bond yields in the EU. This e®ect may derive from the behaviour of investors, who demand higher excess returns
on ¯nancially fragile ¯rms in the uncertain environment of an overheating economy faced with a monetary tightening
(Campbell, 1995).
16For example, Woodford (2003, p. 15) emphasises: \Not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under
current conditions, very little else matters. Few central banks of major industrial nations still make much use of credit
controls or other attempts to directly regulate the °ow of funds through ¯nancial markets and institutions. [...] Instead,
banks restrict themselves to interventions that seek to control the overnight interest rate in an interbank market for central-
bank balances." Further, Clarida et al. (2001, p. 1664) famously claimed that \(u)nder Volcker and Greenspan [...] U.S.
monetary policy adopted the kind of implicit in°ation targeting that we argue is consistent with good policy management".
16this period. By contrast, in the late 1960s and 1970s, in°ation expectations were less well anchored and
in°ationary spirals were much more persistent, leading to stronger long-run responses of longer-term
rates to policy innovations. Many commentators have attributed this regime shift to stronger reaction
coe±cients on the output gap and in°ation in the (implicit) interest rate reaction function of the Fed,
which helped to anchor in°ation expectations more e®ectively (Taylor, 2007). Indeed, central banks can
credibly commit to set an end to a boom by raising interest rates should in°ationary pressures arise.
In this environment, the ¯rst signs of in°ationary pressures are rapidly alleviated and long-term rates
are quickly brought down again after an initial increase. In this sense, the overshooting observed in our
estimation results may re°ect the e±ciency and credibility of the central bank's policy. In a similar vein,
Blinder et al. (2001, p. 8) have argued that, in the second half of the 1990s, small changes in the federal
funds rate were su±cient to stabilise the economy. They suggest that this re°ects an improvement in
the ability of the bond market to forecast the future path of the Fed's interest rate policies. Therefore,
until very recently, many authors attributed the smooth functioning of monetary policy to \greater so-
phistication on the part of ¯nancial markets and greater transparency on the part of central banks, the
two developing in a sort of symbiosis with one another" (Woodford, 2003, p. 16).
An alternative explanation is that other factors such as the weakening of the bargaining position of
workers and trade unions brought about by globalisation and the deregulation of the labour market has
constrained upward wage pressures and hence in°ationary tendencies during booms. Estimates of the
NAIRU have repeatedly transpired to be exaggerated in retrospect and, despite initial fears, persistent
in°ationary pressures have generally not been observed in spite of very low levels of unemployment.
Clearly, these phenomena may help to explain the temporary over-reaction of long-term rates to con-
tractionary monetary policies, as well as the weak long-run in°uence of the latter.17 Moreover, this e®ect
is clearly not limited to the period of monetary tightening starting in 2004. Therefore, the argument
by Smith and Taylor (2007) according to which the decoupling of monetary policy from long-term rates
in this period may have been caused by the expectation of a new structural break in the Fed's inter-
est rate reaction function and a smaller response coe±cient on in°ation seems misplaced (despite the
somewhat reduced overshooting in mortgage rates in 2004). Rather, it seems that the weak in°ationary
pressures throughout the entire period of the Great Moderation have fuelled the expectation that even
long periods of sustained output growth and low unemployment will not require higher interest rates in
the longer-run.
One may even go so far as to invoke the `stability begets instability' view popularised by Minsky
(1975, 1982, 1986) and argue that the enduring tranquility in the labour and ¯nancial markets, in con-
junction with contained in°ationary expectations, created the macroeconomic climate in which ¯nancial
speculation and the massive expansion of credit, together with the continued downward pressure on
long-term yields, could develop. The ongoing deregulation and globalisation of ¯nancial markets has
led to reduced re¯nancing costs, a higher degree of competition in the banking system and more rapid
¯nancial innovation, all of which are certainly consistent with this view. However, in this context, given
the expectation of continuously rising asset prices and low goods market in°ation, it seems highly im-
probable that merely slightly tighter interest rate policies after 2002/3 (as recommended by Taylor,
2009) could have combated these powerful trends. By contrast, had the Fed attempted to signi¯cantly
raise longer-term interest rates via a very strong and continual monetary tightening in an attempt to
17An excellent example is the period 1994-1996, when unemployment fell considerably below accepted NAIRU estimates
without triggering persistent in°ationary pressures and when the overshooting of long-term rates following the Fed's tem-
porary monetary tightening was also very strong, as discussed in Section 5. See Stiglitz (1997, p. 6) for a detailed discussion
of this episode.
17e®ectively ¯ght the housing price bubble, this would almost certainly have led to lower than optimal real
output growth and possibly persistent downward deviation from the Fed's in°ation target.
In general, if our experience of the global ¯nancial crisis has led us to doubt that the Great Moderation
was brought about by good policy management,18 then the alternative explanation is that it was rather
the calm before the storm: it created the illusion that monetary policy had become highly e±cient,
leading to low output volatility, low in°ation and low long-term interest rates. While conventional
monetary policy could not have prevented the recent crisis, the latter has clearly revealed the limitations
of interest rate policies.19 In particular, it seems to con¯rm the well-known dictum that monetary policy
is like a string that can be pulled but not pushed. Rather than working symbiotically, the ¯nancial
markets and the banking system have failed to transmit the expansionary interest rate policies of the
Fed into lower long-term rates (this is readily apparent in Figure 4 above).
However, it is important to note that the sluggish reaction of long-term rates to cuts in policy-
controlled rates is a phenomenon that precedes the ¯nancial crisis. From Figure 4, it is clear that during
previous phases of extended interest rate cuts (such as 1989-91 or 2001-2) the reaction of the mortgage
rate and other lending rates was highly inertial. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, for some interest
rates, including long-term bond yields in the U.S. and most interest rates in Germany, we do not observe
any signi¯cant impact of lower short-term rates even one year after the initial shock. These results
indicate that the interest rate channel of monetary policy may generally be a weak tool for stimulating
aggregate demand, especially in the short-run.
This diagnosis, together with the build-up of ¯nancial fragility despite the `e±cient' containment of
in°ationary pressures throughout the Great Moderation, clearly suggests that good policy management
requires more than a narrow focus on short-term interest rates.20 Given the increasingly widespread
realisation that central banks have repeatedly failed to adapt their policies to changes in the structure
of the ¯nancial system, the need for regulatory innovation is apparent. Such innovation could take the
form of the re-regulation of ¯nancial institutions in order to strengthen and simplify the pass-through of
monetary policy or the development of alternative tools of demand management such as countercyclical
reserve requirements. In the absence of such reform, the likelihood of further painful crises in the near
future seems unacceptably high.
7 Conclusion
We propose a new approach to the analysis of the pass-through from short-term policy administered
interest rates to longer-term loan rates and bond yields. The novelty of our methodology lies in its ability
to model both short- and long-run asymmetries in an easily estimable manner. While the necessity
to distinguish between the short- and the long-run in°uences on the interest rate pass-through was
18A number of studies have investigated the sources of the Great Moderation in an attempt to disentangle the relative
contributions of two main factors: good policy and good luck. For instance, using simulations based on a New Keynesian
model, Benati and Surico (2009) show that the good policy and good luck explanations are almost observationally equivalent.
However, their results are likely to be biased in favour of the good policy explanation since the only sources of change are
the move from passive to active monetary policy, and the presence of sunspots under indeterminacy.
19In it's 2008 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF argues that the the ongoing ¯nancial crisis has disrupted interest
rate pass-through in both the U.S. and the Euro Area, particularly in the case of long-term rates (IMF, 2008). · Cih¶ ak et al.
(2009) ¯nd further evidence of this e®ect in the EU.
20For example, Kobayashi (2008) investigates optimal monetary policy in the presence of incomplete interest rate pass-
through. He argues that the central bank may face a policy dilemma in terms of stabilising changes in the average loan rate
in addition to in°ation and the output gap. Incorporating a loan rate stabilisation term in the loss function of the central
bank causes optimal monetary policy to be more inertial, and thus calls for a more drastic but infeasible policy reaction in
the face of an exogenous shock such as a shift in the loan rate premium.
18recognised conceptually by de Bondt (2002), we are unaware of any existing empirical studies that have
deployed a rigorous econometric framework to explore these e®ects.
Importantly, the existing literature has so far failed to establish a consensus regarding the nature of
the asymmetries characterising the transmission from policy-controlled to bank-lending rates and bond
yields. On the contrary, previous theoretical and empirical studies have come to opposite conclusions.
Our results for both the U.S. and Germany suggest that these apparently contradictory ¯ndings are not
necessarily mutually exclusive in our general framework: the importance of various asymmetry generating
mechanisms may simply depend upon the time horizon. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that
accounting for both short- and long-run asymmetries improves the accuracy of estimation considerably
and reveals complex dynamics that conventional linear models fail to address. In this regard, the pass-
through coe±cients estimated using linear models are largely misleading. By contrast, our NARDL
models can successfully capture the underlying dynamics of the pass-through mechanism and can shed
new light on the alleged decoupling of longer-term rates from policy-controlled rates since the mid-1980s
for the U.S. and since the mid-1990s for Germany. The evidence adduced on this basis suggests that the
interest rate channel of monetary policy is much more complex than is commonly assumed in stylised
theoretical models and that a narrow focus on the interest rate channel of monetary transmission may
be insu±cient to achieve truly optimal policy management. Our experience of the global economic and
¯nancial crisis certainly lends support to this claim.
Finally, we should note two obvious avenues for continuing research. Firstly, despite the rich dynamics
embedded in our model, it nevertheless remains simple in the sense that it does not allow for feedback
e®ects in the way that a system model would. The modelling of asymmetric cointegration in a system
context remains a challenge for future research. Secondly, although we refer to the potential relevance of
business cycle factors for our estimation results, we do not elaborate on the mechanisms at work. This
is an interesting issue which must be addressed before ¯rm policy recommendations can be deduced on
the basis of asymmetric pass-through models.
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22short-run medium-run long-run
Switching costs + +
Information costs + +
Imperfect competition + + +
Business cycle + +
Liquidity preference + +
Asymmetric information - -
Financial innovation - - -
Globalised markets - - -
Deregulated labour market - -
Re¯nancing - -
Note: `+' and `-' denote positive and negative asymmetry, respectively.
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Note: Panel (a) shows what the 3-month T-bill rate would have been, if the Fed had followed Taylor's rule (Taylor 2007).
The simulations in panels (b) and (c) are based on the three di®erent speci¯cations of the estimated pass-through equations
from Table 2 (left: symmetric SR & LR; middle: asymmetric SR, symmetric LR; right: asymmetric SR & LR).
Figure 5: If Greenspan had followed Taylor's rule...
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